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SENDING MEN TO PRISON: CONSTITUTIONAL
ASPECTS OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND
THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEAST DRASTIC
ALTERNATIVE AS APPLIED TO
SENTENCING DETERMINATIONS*
Richard G. Singer
The present state of sentencing in this nation is appalling.' In virtually every jurisdiction, decisions concerning the liberty of human
beings are made in a total vacuum, often in ignorance of the essential
* The views here expressed are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Bar Association or its members, nor those of the Office of
Economic Opportunity or the Ford Foundation, which fund the American Bar Association
Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Services.
t Member of the Maryland Bar; Project Co-Director, ABA Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Services. BA. 1963, Amherst College; J.D. 1966, University of Chicago; LL.M. 1971, Columbia University.
1 The literature on sentencing is already enormous, and continues to grow. Almost
all of it is critical of current practices. The leading works in the area include R. DAwSON,
SENTENCING (1969); E. GREEN, JuDICIAL ATrrruDEs IN SENTENCING (1961); D. NEWMAN, CONVICrION: THE DErERMNATION OF GuILT OR INNOCENCE WrrHOUT TRIAL (1966); D. THOMAS,
PmNCI1L.s OF SENTENCiNG (1970); Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative
Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TES L. REV. 1 (1968); Frankel, Lawlessness in
Sentencing, 41 U. CN. L. REv. 1 (1972); Frankel, The Sentencing Morass, and a Suggestion
for Reform, 3 CRam. L. BuLL. 365 (1967); George, An Unsolved Problem: Comparative
Sentencing Techniques, 45 A.B.A.J. 250 (1959); Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, in THE TASKS OF PENOLOGY 137 (H. Perlman & T. Allington eds. 1969);
Mannheim, Comparative Sentencing Practice,23 LAw & CoNTxM,. PROB. 557 (1958); Pugh
& Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEXAS L.
REv. 25 (1970); Rubin, Allocation of Authority in the Sentencing-Correction Decision, 45
TEXAS L. REv. 455 (1967); Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal
Sentences, 21 BRooxL
L. Rxv. 2 (1954); Turnbladh, A Critique of the Model Penal Code
Sentencing Proposals, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 544 (1958); Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. RFv. 465 (1961); Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's
Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. Rxv. 1281 (1952); Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 COLum. L. REV. 858 (1960); Note, Recidivist
Procedures: Prejudice and Due Process, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 337 (1968); Note, The Presentence Report: An Empirical Study of Its Use in the Federal Criminal Process, 58 GEo.
L.J. 451 (1970); Note, ProceduralDue Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HtAv.
L. REv. 821 (1968); Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 332 (1965); Note, Jury
Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968 (1967).
The growth of sentencing institutes, sentencing councils, and other informational
groups of this type also demonstrates this mushrooming concern. Numerous additional
writers have directed their arrows at one specific aspect of the sentencing code, such as
sexual psychopath statutes and habitual offender statutes. A list of these attacks would be
exceptionally long and unnecessary at this point. Finally, the reports of major study groups,
such as those cited in notes 12-15 infra, also evidence dissatisfaction with current sentencing
processes.
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facts about the defendant, 2 and often without much conception of the
primary purpose of the sentencing decision.3 Moreover, although most
states have sentencing hearings, there is currently no decision from
the United States Supreme Court that requires such a hearing; 4 theoretically it is possible to send a man to prison-perhaps even for lifewithout any face-to-face confrontation at all.
Even if the defendant is given a hearing, he may not fare particularly well, for the law surrounding sentencing procedures is ambiguous,
uncertain, and in some instances contradictory. It is clear only that the
defendant has a constitutional right to counsel. 5 Beyond that the path
becomes murky, although some general observations may be made
concerning the rights of the defendant: (1) he is not entitled, as a matter
of constitutional law, to have a presentence report done on him; 6 (2) if
one is done, he is not entitled, as a matter of constitutional law, to see
2 A number of state statutes require presentence reports on convicted defendants.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-16-2 (1963). Certain other state statutes leave presentence reports to the discretion of the court under some or all circumstances. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-109 (1968); N.C. GtN. STAT. § 15-198 (1965). In jurisdictions where
such reports are not mandatory, their use varies greatly. For example, among all federal
offenders in 1960, 87% received such reports, but there was nevertheless a range of 6%
to virtually 100% usage among the districts of the Fifth Circuit. Sharp, The Presentence

Report, 30 F..D. 242 (1962); see Note, The Presentence Report: An Empirical Study of
Its Use in the FederalCriminal Process, 58 GEo. L.J. 451, 453 (1970). Other studies demon-

strate that usage increases dramatically with the degree of urbanization. See Note, Use of
the Presentence Investigation in Missouri, 1964 WAsH. U.L.Q. 396.

3 Legislatures are unusually reticent about stating the purpose of sentencing or of the
criminal law in general. While many state constitutions proclaim in lofty terms that the
underlying purpose of all punishment is "reformation" or rehabilitation (see, e.g., N.C.
CONST. art. 11, § 2; ORE. CONsr. art. 1, § 15), this policy is generally ignored in the sen.
tencing context. The difficult problem of translating the rehabilitative ethic into sentencing
practice should be faced by legislatures directly, rather than ignored in the hope that the
great disparity in dispositions of sentences will somehow disappear spontaneously.
& The case most likely to be construed as requiring a hearing at sentencing is Mempa
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), which held that counsel was required at a sentencing hearing.
Although the case did not state that due process necessitated a hearing in the first instance,
the logical conclusion, enunciated by both Cohen, supra note 1, at 12, and Pugh & Carver,
supra note 1, at 31, is that a hearing is necessitated. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1966),
can easily be read as holding that a hearing is necessary, but the procedure there involved
sentencing under a sexual offenders act, which was different from the statute under which
the defendant was found guilty. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), a landmark case
holding that due process requires a hearing whenever a "grievous loss" may be inflicted,
even in civil situations, would again seem to argue for a due process hearing requirement,
but the procedure there is also distinguishable from the sentencing process. Nevertheless,
the likelihood is that no state would even attempt to justify taking a man's liberty without
at least some pro forma attempt to afford him a hearing.
5 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Hazelrigg, 430 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Williams, 254 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1958); State v. Patterson, - Iowa -, 161 N.W.2d 736 (1968).
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the report, 7 even though it may have numerous misstatements and
7 See, e.g., Powers v. United States, 825 F.2d 666 (lst Cir. 1963); United States v.
Durham, 181 F. Supp. 503 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 864 U.S. 854 (1960); State v. Moore, 49
Del. 29, 108 A.2d 675 (Super. Ct. 1954); People v. Riley, 376 Ill. 364, 33 N.E.2d 872, cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 586 (1941). Recently, the Fifth Circuit has reaffirmed its position that disclosure is not constitutionally required. United States v. Bakewell, 430 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970). In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), rev'g 343
F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1964), the Supreme Court held that under the District of Columbia
Code reports must be given to counsel for defendant juveniles:
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' statement, attempting to justify
denial of access to these records, that counsel's role is limited to presenting "to the
court anything on behalf of the child which might help the court in arriving at a
decision; it is not to denigrate the staff's submissions and recommendations." On
the contrary, if the staff's submissions include materials which are susceptible to
challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel to "denigrate" such
matter. There is no irrebuttable presumption of accuracy attached to staff reports.
...
Mhe Juvenile Court judge may . . . not . . . receive and rely upon secret
information, whether emanating from his staff or otherwise. The Juvenile Court
is governed in this respect by the established principles which control courts and
quasi-judicial agencies of the Government.
383 US. at 563, quoting 343 F.2d at 258. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), made clear that Kent
was as much decided upon constitutional grounds as it was upon statutory interpretation.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that Kent is now constitutionally mandated, but
it nevertheless held that "[t]he sentencing court should apprise [the defendant], orally
from the bench, of at least such pivotal matters of public record as the conviction and
charges of crime." Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1968). See also
United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); United
States v. Carden, 428 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1970); Roeth v. United States, 380 F.2d 755 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1015 (1967). Some states by judicial decision require complete
disclosure (e.g., State v. Kunz, 55 NJ. 128, 295 A.2d 895 (1969); ci. State v. Grady, 89 Idaho
204, 404 P.2d 347 (1965)); other states make disclosure a matter of the trial court's discretion
(e.g., State v. Moore, 49 Del. 29, 108 A.2d 675 (Super. Ct. 1954); People v. Riley, 376 Ill.
364, 33 N.E.2d 872, cert. denied, 313 U.S. 586 (1941); Costello v. State, 237 Md. 464, 206
A.2d 812 (1965); People v. Malkowski, 25 Mich. App. 195, 181 N.W.2d 6 (1970), af'd, 385
Mich. 244, 188 N.W.2d 559 (1971). Disclosure is required in some states by statute. E.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 23 (1959); CAL. PEAL CODE § 1203 (West 1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-278.1
(Supp. 1972). Disclosure has been mandatory in England since 1948. See English Criminal
Justice Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58, § 43.
Two recent federal decisions presage further inroads into discretionary disclosure.
In United States v. Janiec, 464 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1972), the court held that, as a constitutional matter, at least the defendant's past criminal record as recorded in the presentence
report must be disclosed unless the trial judge disclaims any reliance on it. The court
thus left decision on the question of mandatory disclosure to future cases or to the Supreme Court. Approximately one month later, the First Circuit held, though not by constitutional compulsion, that disclosure was required with regard to all matters upon which
the trial court relied, unless this disclosure would damage the defendant or endanger others.
In that case, United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1972), the trial court had relied
upon information that the defendant was deeply involved in crime. The defense attorney,
but not the defendant, was allowed to see the report. This, the court of appeals said, was
simply not enough-the defendant was entitled to see the parts of the report relied upon
in sentencing.
Whether the contents of presentence reports should be revealed to defendant or his
counsel is an issue that has split judges and criminologists for at least the last 25 years.
Those opposing disclosure point to the possible "drying up" of sources from whom confi-
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errors in it; s and (3) he probably has no right to cross-examine those
who do accuse him or those whose accusations are made to the probation officer.9
These failings in the current sentencing procedures employed in
most jurisdictions have not escaped the attention-and condemnation
-of recent studies of sentencing. Judges, 0 legal scholars," and eminent
dential information is supposedly often obtained, the possible "dragging out" of sentencing
by an "acrimonious, often pointless," adversary proceeding, the undermining of the relationship between the defendant and his ultimate probation officer if the officer originally
recommends some incarceration, and possible psychological damage to the defendant himself. See, e.g., Parsons, The Presentence Investigation Report Must Be Preserved as a Confidential Document, 28 FED. PROBATION 3, 4-6 (March 1964); Roche, The Position for
Confidentiality of the Presentence Investigation Report, 29 ALBANY L. Rxv. 206, 217-24
(1965); Sharp, The Confidential Nature of Presentence Reports, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 127,
138 (1955).
Those favoring disclosure are equally adamant. See PRESIDENT'S COaras'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRaIE IN A FREE SoCiErY
145 (1967); Higgins, Confidentiality of PresentenceReports, 28 ALBANY L. REV. 12, 27 (1964);
Katkin, Presentence Reports: An Analysis of Uses, Limitations and Civil Liberties Issues,
55 MINN. L. REv. 15, 30 (1970); Wyzanski, supra note 1, at 1291-92; Note, Employment of
Social Investigation Reports in Criminal and Juvenile Proceedings,58 COLUM. L. REV. 702,
705-07 (1958). Three institutional authors have recommended varying degrees of disclosure.
The first edition of the Model Sentencing Act of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency made disclosure discretionary in the ordinary case, but mandatory where the
sentence was for more than five years. MODEL SENTENCING Aar § 4 (1963). The soon-to-bepublished second edition, however, makes disclosure mandatory in all cases. MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 4 (2d ed. 1972). The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code provides
only that the defense counsel be advised of pertinent facts in the report. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 7.07(5) (1962). The American Bar Association strongly urges the disclosure of the
bulk of the presentence report. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JTIrsCE, STANDARDs RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIvEs AND PROCEDUREs § 4.4

(1967).
The relevant provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FED. R. CRm. P.
32(c)(2)) provides that the judge "may disclose" the contents of the report.
8 There are many reported cases in which mistakes or misinformation in the presentence report have ultimately come to light. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 US. 736
(1948); United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel Brown
v. Rundie, 417 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1969); State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d 647
(App. Div. 1960); cf. United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1061 (1972); United States ex rel. Jackson v. Myers, 374 F.2d '707 (3d Cir. 1967);
State v. Killian, 91 Ariz. 140, 370 P.2d 287 (1962).
9 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
10 Judges Marvin Frankel and Simon Sobeloff have been vociferous champions of
change. See Frankel, supra note 1; Sobeloff, supra note 1. Other members of the judiciary
have spoken of the need for revision and reconsideration, although perhaps not as strenuously. See, e.g., Doyle, A Sentencing Council in Operation, 25 FED. PROBATION 27 (Sept.
1961); Parsons, Aids in Sentencing, 35 F.R.D. 423 (1964); Parsons, The Personal Factor in
Sentencing, 13 DEPAuL L. REv. 1 (1963); Zavatt, Sentencing Procedure in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 41 F.R.D. 469 (1966). General judicial
comment can be found in the sentencing institutes which have proliferated since 1958,
when they were first authorized by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1970). Reports of these
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committees of the American Bar Association, 2 the American Law Institute, 8 the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 4 and the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice' 5 have all criticized present techniques and recommended
major improvements in the field as a matter of sound correctional

policy.
One question almost never faced by the criminal law, penologists,
judges, prosecutors, or defense counsel is: in a sentencing procedure,
who carries the burden of proof concerning the justification for a particular sentence? The thesis of this paper-tentatively suggested-is
that before the state (including the trial judge) may constitutionally
sentence a man to prison, the record must conclusively demonstrate that
all other "less drastic" alternatives have been considered and rejected
as unsuitable for this particular offender; that in effect the state government bears the burden of demonstrating that the defendant cannot be
allowed to remain in the community, even under partial supervision,
but must be removed from the community to a penal institution.
I

Tim LEAST DRASTIC ALTERNATIVE
A.

The Doctrine Articulated

Briefly stated, the doctrine of the least drastic alternative requires
that a state demonstrate a particular legislative course to be the least
drastic method of achieving a desired end.' The Supreme Court in
institutes can be found at 54 F.R.D. 285 (1972); 49 id. 347 (1970); 45 id. 149 (1969); 42 id.
175 (1968); 41 id. 467 (1967); 39 id. 523 (1966); 37 id. 111 (1965); 35 id. 381 (1964); 30 id.
401 (1962); 27 id. 293 (1961). State judicial institutes are reported at 46 id. 497 (1969); 40
id. 399 (1967); 45 Cal. Rptr. following 1028, Appendix (1965).
11 See note 1 supra.
12 The American Bar Association conducted a massive study of sentencing in 1967.
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N PROJECt ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (1967). The ABA followed this with
its report on appellate review of sentences. AMERICAN BAR As'N PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIV OF SENTENCES
(1968). Both works strongly criticized present sentencing structures.
13 MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).
14 MODEL SENTENCING ACT (1968); id. (2d ed. 1972).
15 The work of the Crime Commission is well-known. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSrICF, supra note 7. Its most thorough analysis of
sentencing is found in chapter five on the role of the courts. Id. at 141-46.
16 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 687
(1969); Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. RFv.
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expressing this principle has spoken of using "less drastic means"' 7 or
methods that are "necessary"' 8 to effectuate the state's purpose, but the
import of these various formulations is the same-the state must demonstrate that the infringement upon human liberties which occurs is
unavoidable if the purpose of the state is to be achieved. Some examples
may clarify the point. If the purpose of a one-year residency requirement for welfare is to avoid welfare fraud, that waiting period is too
drastic and must be invalidated since the state may achieve its interest
by telephoning the city from which the applicant came. 19 If the purpose
of a similar requirement for voting is to assure that the voter has an
interest in the outcome, that requirement too must fail since the state
may simply ask the voter to affirm that he is a bona fide resident of the
community.20 If the state wishes to determine the competence of its
teachers, it cannot require them to list all the organizations to which
they belong, since an investigation of their competence in the classroom
would be a more direct method of reaching the same end.21
The doctrine is not new. Indeed, Professors Francis Wormuth and
Harris Mirkin have suggested that virtually all first amendment cases
decided on the basis of vagueness or overbreadth can be interpreted in
the language of this doctrine. 22 For example, if a statute is struck down
for overbreadth, the analysis under the doctrine is clear: the language
of the statute, the method used for protecting the state's interest, is too
broad and thus too "drastic." The state's interest can be served by the
"least broad" language that effectuates the purpose of the exercise of
police power while affording notice to the offender. 23
In the past few years, the overbreadth test has generally been
254 (1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YArX L.J. 464 (1969).
The doctrine is of course predicated upon establishing a sufficient interest in the area to
justify legislating at all.
17 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969).
18 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 30, 342 (1972).
19 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969).
20 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 852 (1972).
-21 Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
22 Wormuth & Mirkin, supra note 16, at 267-93. See also Note, supra note 16, at 464.
23 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 864 U.S.
479, 488 (1960); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). See generally Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,83 HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970).

Similarly, vague statutes may be overbroad depending upon the interpretation given
them by local officials. One of the classic cases in this mold is Kunz v. New York, 840 U.S.
290 (1951), finding an ordinance unconstitutionally vague because it left unfettered discretion in the hands of administrative officials. Accord, Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147
(1939); see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 67 (1960). For recent examples of the vagueness doctrine in action, see Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 318 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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coupled with the requirement that the state demonstrate a "compelling"
interest in regulating the activity at all.24 The latter standard was a
major breakthrough by the Warren Court in its waning years. Like the
"least drastic" test, it shifts to the state the burden of justifying legislative restrictions on constitutional liberties. The reception given this requirement by the new appointees to the Court has been cool at best,
and at times has been openly hostile.25 The compelling state interest
doctrine has thus far been limited by the courts, both high and low, to
instances where "fundamental human liberties" are involved. 26
The compelling state interest test must be contrasted with the other
basic test by which courts judge legislation: that the interest served be
a legitimate one to which the challenged legislation bears some "reasonable" or "rational" relation. 27 Clearly, the two tests take radically different approaches to the enforcement of legislative enactments. The latter
will uphold legislation if any justification, however feeble, may be
suggested; indeed, the Court has sometimes said that if any reasonably
conceivable state of facts could arise which would justify the legisla28
tion, it would be the Court's duty to uphold the legislative power.
The former standard takes precisely the opposite view: where funda24 Two of the principal cases applying this test are Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Other voting rights cases utilizing the
same approach include Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
895 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). A
thorough examination of the trend toward the use of the new doctrine can be found in
Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1076-131 (1969).
25 In his dissent in Dunn, Chief Justice Warren Burger severely criticized the doctrine,
saying that it presented an "insurmountable standard." 405 U.S. at 863-64. For an examination of this view, see notes 111-13 and accompanying text infra.
26 See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), in which the Court refused to find

a denial of the equal protection of the laws to individuals eligible for low-rent housing
in a California constitutional provision requiring approval by a majority of those voting
in a community referendum for the development of any low-rent housing project. The
decision was apparently premised upon the reasoning that classifications based on wealth
-at least of the kind under consideration-do not infringe upon "fundamental human
liberties."
Precisely what constitutes a "fundamental human liberty" remains unclear. In recent
cases, the right to wear one's hair the length one wishes (Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069
(8th Cir. 1971)), the right to have an abortion (Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (NJ). Tex.
1970), prob. juris. postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971), restored for reargument, 408 U.S. 919
(1972)), and the right to education (Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 8d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487
P.2d 1241 (1971)) have all been deemed fundamental human liberties. See Houle, Compelling State Interest v. Mere Rational Classification: The Practitioner'sEqual Protection
Dilemma, 3 URBAN LAw. 375 (1971).
27 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 866 US. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
28 See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 US. 412, 415 (1920); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US. 61, 78 (1911).
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mental interests are concerned, the statute loses its presumption of
constitutionality; it may even be said that on occasion the statute is
2
presumed to be unconstitutional.

9

In short, the dividing line between instances where one test or the
other is employed is said to be that when "fundamental interests" or
"fundamental human liberties" are involved, the Court brandishes the
compelling state interest test; when the regulation affects only "economic" interests, the legislation is measured by the more lenient standards of "legitimate state interest" and "rational relation."30
Because each recent Supreme Court case using the "least drastic
alternative" approach has also applied the "compelling state interest"
test, there is some danger that the two will be viewed as inseparable.
That, however, is not a necessary conclusion. It would be possible for
the Court to state the standard in terms of whether a legitimate state
interest was being served in the least drastic way or, conversely, whether
the method used by the state had any rational relation to the achievement of a compelling and critical state interest. Indeed, Chief Justice
Burger has on occasion indicated that he would be more comfortable
with the legitimate interest-necessary test where "fundamental freedoms" are involved. 31 Taken in its usual sense, "necessary" implies that
the means chosen must be not merely "sufficient" to achieve the end
sought by the state, but essential, i.e., that there is no less severe way to
achieve the result. Thus, Burger's position appears to hold that a rational, not compelling, state interest is sufficient to justify intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area, but that the state must then meet
the doctrine of the "necessary" or "least drastic" remedy.
The combination of the compelling state interest test and the least
drastic alternative test may be, as the present Chief Justice has indi29 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (concurring opinion). This has
also been said with regard to statutes which establish a system of prior restraint on first
amendment freedoms. See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
30 There is much to be said for the argument that no distinction really exists, since
the right to control one's own property-for example, economic control of a businesscould be seen as a "fundamental" interest of every person. However, the degree to which
the courts recognize a distinction seems sufficient, at least for the moment, to allow us to
speak of these two categories of cases. The Court's recent decision in Lynch v. Household
Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 588 (1972), holding that for jurisdictional purposes there is no
distinction between personal liberties and proprietary rights, may have some impact here
as well. Although Lynch rests on an interpretation of statutes defining the scope of federal
court jurisdiction, the majority opinion acknowledges a "fundamental interdependence"
between personal and property rights. Id. at 552.
31 The Chief Justice's opinion in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 184 (1972), suggesting a
"dose scrutiny" to determine whether the statute was "necessary" to achieve a legitimate
state purpose (id. at 144), comes dose to proposing this combination. So, also, does the
Chief Justice's dissent in Dunn, if only by implication. See 405 U.S. at 368-64.
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cated, an "insurmountable" standard for states to meet. 32 A state must

currently demonstrate not only that it should be legislating but also
that there is no better alternative. This places the onus of proving a
negative upon the state. It would, as the Chief Justice implies, be
highly unlikely that an adversary would not be able to suggest some
other method which could achieve the interest, but which would impinge "just a litle" less on the "fundamental interest" involved. 8
Great controversy might well arise in many contexts over what
method is the "least drastic." A good example might come from the
voting area. One could argue that if the state makes fraudulent voting
criminal and punishes it with x number of years in prison, then it
should not put up any pre-voting barriers at all. The entire process of
registration could be opposed on the basic premise that the state deters
fraudulent voters by penalizing them criminally, and that any other
strictures would only "chill" legitimate voters by, for example, making
them register at a distant election board. 4 Others might argue, however, that imprisonment is a severe-drastic-remedy, and that registration procedures should be made even more cumbersome to deter
all fraud in balloting, which would serve to eliminate the need for the
severe sanction of incarceration.
To date, the arguments have not been carried this far; the Court
has generally avoided discussion of the possibilities of friction and of
speculation in determining whether there is a "less drastic" method.
But the far-reaching implications of the doctrine and the difficulties
in determining its limits suggest that careful scrutiny should be employed before it is expanded to encompass new areas. Several recent
decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit have begun to crystallize
the application of the concept.
B.

Lake, Covington, and Dixon: Willows in a Constitutional Windstorm?

In Lake v. Cameron35 a senile woman was civilly committed to
a mental institution, having been judged "of unsound mind" after a
policeman found her wandering about the city. Upon her petition for
habeas corpus, the lower court denied relief after conducting a hearing
32 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 364 (1972) (dissenting opinion); see note 25 and

accompanying text supra.
33 405 U.S. at 363-64.
34 See Note, Constitutional Standards Applicable to Voter Registration Closing Dates,

5 J.L. RrEosrm 304, 314 (1972).
35

864 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Burger, then Circuit Judge, dissented in Lake, an

ominous sign for those who seek to apply its logic elsewhere.
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on the issue, 6 but noted that she could make further application "in
the event that [she] is in a position to show that there would be some
facilities available for her provision."3 7 Relying on a newly-enacted
District of Columbia law that shifted the burden of proof in this type
of case, 88 the court of appeals, per Judge Bazelon, reversed, holding
that the burden was on the state to demonstrate that incarceration in
a secure hospital was the only alternative through which the community
could be protected.3 9
The Lake case made clear that in a civil commitment proceeding
the burden is upon the state to demonstrate that institutionalization is
necessary to achieve the objective of treatment and care of persons committed. Nonetheless, Lake was ambiguous, since its focus on the availability of alternatives was arguably mandated by the statute, which
required the court to determine that no less secure alternatives would
suffice. 40
Covington v. Harris41 was more direct. Covington had been civilly
committed to the same hospital involved in the Lake case. But the commitment was only technically civil, since it followed a determination
by the hospital that he was incompetent to stand trial for murder and
would probably remain that way. There was, therefore, a criminal
"tinge" to the incarceration. Upon his arrival, Covington had been
placed in the maximum security ward. Thereafter, however, he had
been kept under heavy sedation, after which he was far less violent,
leading his supervising physician to recommend his transfer to a less
secure division of the hospital. When the recommendation was denied,
Covington brought a habeas corpus action. While that suit was pending, he was accused of stealing within the institution. Primarily on that
basis, the district court denied the habeas corpus petition.4
386The district court originally denied the petition without a hearing, but the court
of appeals remanded, ordering a hearing. Lake v. Cameron, 331 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965). The substantive decision is the appeal from the district
court's unreported action on that remand.
37 Quoted in 364 F.2d at 659.
38 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-501 to -591 (1967).
39 The court specifically mentioned public health nursing care, community mental
health and day care services, foster care, home health aid services, and welfare payments
as alternatives. 364 F.2d at 661. The scope of these alternatives and of the many other possibilities they suggest is part of the importance of Lake. On final remand, the district court

found that commitment in the hospital with dosed wards was fully warranted in light of
the evidence and the lack of any other facility within the district capable of treating petitioner. 267 F. Supp. 155 (D.D.C. 1967).
40 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b) (1967).

41 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
42 The lower court decision is unreported. For a more expansive treatment of the
facts leading to that proceeding, see id. at 619-20.
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The court of appeals, again per Judge Bazelon, reversed the dismissal, requiring the state to demonstrate that less severe confinement
was not justified.48 Citing Lake, the court expressly declared that the
result in Covington, and even in Lake, was not dependent solely on the
presence of legislation requiring consideration of alternatives:
The principle of the least restrictive alternative is equally applicable to alternate dispositions within a mental hospital. It makes
little sense to guard zealously against the possibility of unwarranted
deprivations prior to hospitalization, only to abandon the watch
once the patient disappears behind hospital doors. The range
of possible dispositions of a mentally ill person within a hospital,
from maximum security to out-patient status, is almost as wide as
that of dispositions without. The commitment statute no more authorizes unnecessary restrictions within the former range than it
does within the latter.
[B]efore a court can determine that the hospital's decision
to confine a patient in a maximum security ward is, within its
broad discretion, "permissible and reasonable .. .in view of the
relevant information," it must be able to conclude that the hospital
has considered and found inadequate all relevant alternative dispositions within the hospital."
...

Though Lake was dearly a civil commitment, and Covington was
arguably civil, there can be no question of the criminal character of the
confinement in Dixon v. Jacob.45 That case involved a St. Elizabeth's
Hospital inmate incarcerated after being found innocent, only on
grounds of insanity, of murder and assault with intent to commit
carnal knowledge. As Judge Leventhal, concurring, made clear, "Plainly
the acquittal by reason of insanity reflects a jury determination, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that except for the defense of insanity, defendant
did do the act ... ."46 This, then, was the status closest to a "criminal"
commitment; if any case speaks to the application of the least drastic
alternative doctrine to the criminal field, it would be, thus far, the
Dixon case.
The difficulty with this analysis is that Dixon said nothing--or
virtually nothing-about a less drastic alternative. Only in a passing
reference to Covington did Judge Bazelon, again the author of the
Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 623-24 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted), quoting Tribby v. Cameron,
579 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
45 427 F-2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
46 Id. at 601 (concurring opinion).
43
44
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majority opinion, indicate that the doctrine might apply to this
inmate. 7 The holding was much narrower, based on an issue of exhaustion of remedies. 48 Furthermore, as if in anticipation that Dixon
might be thought to apply in the criminal field, Judge Bazelon would
appear to have discouraged that interpretation:
Confinement of the mentally ill rests upon a basis substantially
different from that which supports confinement of those convicted
of crime .... Confinement of the mentally ill.., depends not only
upon the validity of the initial commitment but also the continuing status of the patient. 49
Judge Bazelon's statement seems directed more at making clear
that, in contrast to civil commitment, continual review of a criminal
incarceration, absent at least a provision for parole, is not statutorily
or constitutionally mandated. However, in his intimation elsewhere
that to the mentally ill individual, criminal and civil commitment
are essentially indistinguishable, 0 Judge Bazelon may have provided
an argument for moving the law of criminal commitment closer to
the law of civil commitment, rather than delineating a boundary
between them.51
These three opinions may launch the doctrine of the least drastic
alternative to application in other contexts where its use is arguably
appropriate.52 It is surely not too much, on the face of the matter, to
at 597.
48 In response to Dixon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the hospital averred,
inter alia, that petitioner had not exhausted available administrative remedies. The court
of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of the petition without a hearing on the
ground that there was no showing by the government that administrative remedies had
not been exhausted sufficient to dismiss the petition summarily. Id. at 600.
49 Id. at 595 (footnote omitted).
50 See Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. Rav. 742, 748-49,
752-53 (1969).
47 Id.

51 Cf. Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 Y.LE

L.J. 87, 99 (1967), positing that the difference between civil commitment and imprisonment
for a crime is basically the stigma which attaches to the criminal. Whether there is a
constitutionally recognizable difference between criminal and civil commitment, either
in terms of procedure or substantive justification for incarceration, is an issue that has been
reinvigorated by the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Humphrey, Jackson, and
McNeil, discussed in note 147 infra. The import of this set of cases may well be to erase
totally the line between civil and criminal commitment.
52. The impact of the decisions in the areas of right to treatment, judicial review of
institutional decisions, and general mental health law is obvious. See, e.g., Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Judge Bazelon has almost single-handedly
established a place for the law in the field of mental health. Consider his remarks in
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 621-22 (D.C. Cir. 1969), concerning the proper scope of
judicial review in the system of checks and balances in this country:
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ask state officials to justify severe restrictions upon individuals. This
is what the doctrine employed by Judge Bazelon has done for over a
quarter of a century-with one important difference. In other cases
in which the doctrine has been applied, the challenge was to the constitutionality of a statute or regulation by an individual, or group of
individuals. Thus, for example, the challenge in Shelton v. Tucker
was directed at an Arkansas statute which required that all teachers
in the state schools file an annual affidavit listing their membership in
organizations. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board4 involved section 2 of the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950, 55 and McGowan v. Maryland56 challenged state blue laws.
The breadth of the challenge stems from the doctrine that a party
attacking a statute on first amendment grounds may argue any invalidity of the statute at all, even if the invalidity might not otherwise
apply to him.5 7 If the challenger is successful, the remedy is not merely
applicable to him. The entire statute falls, and the state must urge its
legislature to take up the cudgel once more to try to define more
narrowly and precisely the interest at hand.
In Lake, Covington, and Dixon, however, the plaintiffs did not
allege, at least in the part pertinent to our consideration here, that
the concept of incarceration of the mentally ill is per se violative of
substantive due process. Nr did they argue that the particular statutes
involved were unduly broad. Their challenge was much more limited:
that the authorities in dealing with them had not sought out the least
restrictive method of dealing with their individual needs and problems.
In no instance was an allegation of a pattern of discriminatory application made; nor was an attempt to include or define a class even
Not only the principle of judicial review, but the whole scheme of American
government, reflects an institutionalized mistrust of any . . . unchecked and unbalanced power over essential liberties. That mistrust does not depend on an
assumption of inveterate venality or incompetence on the part of men in power,
be they Presidents, legislators, administrators, judges, or doctors. It is not doctors'
nature, but human nature, which benefits from the prospect and the fact of supervision. Indeed, the limited scope of judicial review of hospital decisions necessarily assumes the good faith and professional expertise of the hospital staff.
Judicial review is only a safety catch against the fallibility of the best of men;
and not the least of its services is to spur them to double-check their own performance and provide them with a checklist by which they may readily do so.
53 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
54 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
55 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
56 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
57 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 280 U.S. 479 (1965); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355
U.S. 313 (1958); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); cf. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963). See generally Sedler, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the
Supreme Court, 71 YA L.J. 599 (1962).
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suggested. Likewise, the remedies sought and provided were individual
only.
Furthermore, in none of the cases was any attempt made to say
that the state's general powers did not extend to the particular kind
of restrictions placed upon the petitioner. Plaintiff Lake did not
suggest, for example, that the state could not, in a proper case, put one
in a mental hospital rather than in a community treatment center, nor
did Covington suggest that no person could be put in maximum
security. Both petitioners were alleging that as applied to them, and
them only, the restrictions imposed were unwarranted.
Thus viewed, the three cases border closely upon another doctrine
emerging in a related field-the requirement of proportionality and
nonexcessiveness in criminal penalties. 58 Like the doctrine of the least
drastic alternative as applied to individuals, the doctrine of proportionality arguably deals not with the legitimacy of the sanction
per se59 but with the propriety of the sanction's use in light of the
particular facts of a case. However, one important difference between
the two doctrines is of significance in evaluating their comparative
strengths and limitations. The least drastic alternative places the
burden of justification upon the state, whereas the nascent proportionality doctrine requires the challenging party to demonstrate the invalidity of the state action.
II
THE RFQUIEMFNT OF PROPORTIONALITY

The classic case of Weems v. United States6 ° served as a precursor
to the requirement of proportionality in criminal sentences. The crime
alleged in Weems was falsification of a government ledger; the sentence,
which was explicitly spelled out in the governing Philippine statute,
provided for imprisonment from twelve to twenty years at hard labor
and severe civil disabilities after release. In a masterful opinion, Justice
McKenna found in the broad language of the Philippine bill of rights61
58 See generally Singer, Bringing the Constitution to Prison: Substantive Due Process
and the Eighth Amendment, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 650, 655-57 (1970).
59 See notes 66-70 and accompanying text infra for the argument that the doctrine
invalidates only statutes, and not specific penalties under those statutes. But cf. notes 74-81
and accompanying text infra.
60 217 U.S. 349 (1910).

The basis for the opinion was no different from the eighth amendment problems
facing the Court today. Certain principles "were deemed 'essential to the rule of law and
the maintenance of individual freedom.' ... Among these rules was that which prohibited
61
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a policy that "punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." 62 Rejecting the limitation suggested by
Justice White in dissent 63 that the eighth amendment outlawed onl
the Stuart horrors 4 of quartering and the rack, the Court spoke in no
uncertain terms about the severity of the punishment and the ignominy with which the petitioner was saddled:
[The law's] minimum degree [of punishment] is confinement in a
penal institution for twelve years and one day, a chain at the ankle
and wrists of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance
from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or
rights of property, no participation even in the family council.
These parts of his penalty endure for the term of imprisonment.
From other parts there is no intermission. His prison bars and
chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from
them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is forever kept
under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice and view
of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicil
without giving notice to the "authority immediately in charge of
his surveillance," and without permission in writing. He may not
seek, even in other scenes and among other people, to retrieve his
fall from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him and he is
subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron
bars and stone walls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty. No circumstance of degradation is omitted.
It may be that even the cruelty of pain is not omitted. He must
bear a chain night and day.5
Despite the exhortation by the Court that a comparison with
punishments for other crimes "condemns the sentence in this case as
cruel and unusual," 6 it is reasonably certain that the decision rested
upon the finding that the entire statute was so disproportionate that
it all fell at one stroke. 67 However, Weems left unanswered one critical
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 867-68, quoting Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100, 122 (1904) (instructions of the President to the Philippine Commis-

sion).

62 217 U.S. at 367.
63 Id. at 409-10 (dissenting opinion).

64 For an enlightening discussion of what the prohibition of the English Bill of Rights
of 1689, from which the eighth amendment was copied, was originally intended to mean,
see Granucd, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57
CAuF. L. REv. 839 (1969).
65 217 U.S. at 566.
06 Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
0 Two reasons appear to solidify this interpretation. First, the Court in its concluding

paragraph observed: "It follows from these views that, even if the minimum penalty...
had been imposed, it would have been repugnant to the bill of rights. In other words,
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question: if the statutory sentence had been one to twenty years, and
the judge had set the sentence at twelve years, would the Court have
determined the case the same way?68
The Court has never resolved that question. 69 But for the last
the fault is in the law ....
Id. at 382. Second, the Court throughout its opinion discussed the severity of the minimum sentence, i.e., 12 years. See text accompanying note 65
supra. The sentence actually imposed was 15 years. See 217 U.S. at 358. Had the Court intended to ground its decision upon the gravity of the particular sentence involved, it would
have discussed the latter figure.

68 This determination is relevant to the proportionality doctrine. If a statute is
struck down in its entirety because the minimum is simply too harsh for any enumerated
crime, the legislature has merely to amend the statute. If, however, it is the sentence which
is disproportionate, then reviewing courts must examine the facts of each case to determine whether the punishment fits the crime and the criminal.
69 One commentator on the Weems case and its subsequent lack of clarification places
the blame on the Supreme Court itself:
Seven years after the Weems decision the Supreme Court rejected by implication its comparative criteria for excessiveness. The case was Badders v. United
States [240 U.S. 391 (1916)]. There the defendant argued that by making the
deposit of each letter a separate offense of using the mail for fraud, the government had violated the Eighth Amendment. He was sentenced on seven counts to
thirty-five years in prison and seven thousand dollars in fines. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes ...
said that the punishment was not in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. However, he cited Howard v. Fleming [191 U.S. 126
(1903)], a case which had repudiated the comparative approach by ruling that
punishments given for more serious crimes were not relevant on the question of
excessiveness. Thus, while the Weems doctrine has not been specifically overruled
by the Supreme Court, the method for its implementation has been implicitly
rejected.
Turkington, Unconstitutionally Excessive Punishments: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment and the Weems Principle,3 Ca m. L. BULL. 145, 148 (1967). Turkington's reading of the two cases is, however, suspect. In Badders, the Court dismissed the appellant's
contention that seriatim sentences on five counts of mail fraud for mailing five separate
letters was cruel and unusual punishment by a simple citation to the Fleming decision
without further discussion. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1917). Fleming,
however, is clearly distinguishable from both Badders and Weems, and it is poor authority
both for the Badders decision and for any suggestion that Weems had been overruled. In
Fleming, North Carolina defendants argued that their sentences were violative of equal
protection because others convicted of "worse" crimes had received "less severe" sentences.
The Court dismissed this contention, noting simply that a state could determine that
some crimes were more troublesome to that state and, hence, hand out harsher penalties.
Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 135-36 (1903). On its face, Fleming may appear to be
inconsistent with Weems, but two distinctions can be made. First, the challenge was based
on equal protection, not on cruel and unusual punishment, undoubtedly because at that
time the eighth amendment had not been held applicable to the states. Indeed, in O'Neil
v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892), the Court had affirmed its inapplicability, and it was
not until 1962 that the amendment was finally held applicable to the states in Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Second, the challenge did not mention the doctrine of
proportionality. The argument was not even hinted at, and no cases were cited either by
appellants in their brief or by the Court in its opinion to support the proposition that
sentences be consonant with the gravity of the crime. To say, therefore, that Badders,
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fifty years virtually every lower court deciding the question, both
federal and state, has followed the narrow import of Weems, considering the minimum sentence allowable under the statute as the decisive
factor; any sentence within the legislatively set maximum has been
upheld where the parameters of the statute meet eighth amendment
criteria.7 0 Recently, however, there have been instances in which courts
have expressed willingness to break from that rigid pattern. In Watson
v. United States,71 a panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
invalidated a ten-year statutory minimum sentence for selling narcotics
as applied to narcotics addicts. However, the panel's decision was
vacated, and the case remanded on other less sweeping grounds by an
en banc court.7

2

Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Workman

v. Commonwealth,7 3 invalidated a statute, as it applied to juveniles,
which imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for
rape. Weems, Workman, and Watson are not true proportionality
cases, however, since in each the court struck down a statutory minimum which was far in excess of what civilized men could tolerate.
This fault cannot be found in Ralph v. Warden71 In Ralph, the
defendant was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death by a threejudge district court.1 5 The Maryland statute permitted precisely this
discretionary decision; the penalties prescribed ranged from eighteen
months' imprisonment to death.7 6 In a significant opinion, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the imposition of the death
Fleming, or both read together "rejected" the proportionality doctrine of Weems when
neither case discussed the doctrine seems strange indeed. It is true, of course, that an application of the Weems doctrine might have resulted in a different conclusion, but that is
far from saying that the Court sub silentio rejected Weems, particularly since Badders was
decided only five years after Weems, and Fleming was decided before Weems.
70 The cases holding that courts will not review sentences within the legislative
maximum are legion. Thus, for example, a sentence of eight years' imprisonment for an
18-year-old convicted of stealing approximately one dollar at knifepoint has been upheld
where the statutory maximum was not transcended. Stanford v. State, 110 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1959). Other cases are collected in S. RUBIN, H. WEIHOFEN, G. EDWARDS, & S. RoSENZWExG,

Tnm
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381-82 (1963). See also Mosk, The Eighth Amendment

Rediscovered, 1 LoYoLA U.L. RV. 4, 11 (1968).
71 37 U.S.L.W. 2352 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 1968), vacated and remanded, 439 F.2d 442
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
12 489 F2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
73 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
74 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
75 The lower court opinion is unreported. For the interesting background of Ralph's
case, which includes four petitions for post-conviction relief and four prior habeas corpus
petitions, see 438 F.2d at 787 & n.l.
76 MD. CODE

art. 27, § 461 (1957).
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penalty under the particular circumstances of the case violated the
eighth amendment. Yet the court did not invalidate the death penalty
for all rapists, 77 and it went out of its way to make clear that it did not
necessarily find the death penalty unconstitutional per se.78 Ralph,
therefore, cannot be dismissed as striking down the minimum sentence
which the judge could impose pursuant to statute with reference to
all criminal defendants. The court, employing its discretion, differentiated among the types of criminal offenders within the class. It
indicated that various gradations of wrongdoing could be said to fall
within the statutorily delineated offense, and endeavored to apportion
the penalty according to the gravity of the misconduct of the offender.
In a sense, therefore, the court tailored the penalty to the heinousness
of the wrongdoer's offense, thereby effectively reviewing the determination of the trial court on the particular sentence as applied to the
particular defendant.
One caveat must be added. Although the narrow holding of the
court was that the sentence imposed upon the defendant was too severe
for his particular crime, the opinion can be read as standing for the
much broader proposition7 9 that in any case in which life has not been
endangered or taken,8 0 the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional. In a sense, therefore, the court did strike down a penalty
imposed upon a dass-a theme common to Workman and Watson as
well."' The broader language and implications of the case cannot be
77 Cf. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83
HAv. L. REv. 1773 (1970). Of course, the Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), if interpreted to hold the death penalty unconstitutional in rape cases,
would obviate the need for determining the precise point at issue in Ralph. Nevertheless,
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Ralph is the "official" opinion since certiorari was ultimately denied, and it can surely be cited for the proportionality concept in orienting

punishment to defendants as individuals.
78 See 438 F.2d at 793.
79 [We conclude, therefore, that two factors coalesce to establish that the death
sentence is so disproportionate to the crime of rape when the victim's life is
neither taken nor endangered that it violates the Eighth Amendment. First,
in most jurisdictions death is now considered an excessive penalty for rape ...
Second, when a rapist does not take or endanger the life of his victim, the selection
of the death penalty from the range of punishment authorized by statute is
anomalous to the large number of rapists who are sentenced to prison.
Id.
80 There is some question as to what the court meant here. The defendant had in fact
threatened the woman and her child with a tire iron if she refused to submit. Thus,
the court must have meant that violence-above and beyond the rape itself-must have
actually occurred, and, because of the violence inflicted, life must have been endangered.
81 The same kind of analysis might be applied where the court has clearly abused its
discretion in imposing the maximum. The latest example, and perhaps the most important,
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easily dismissed. Ralph stands as one of the key cases establishing the
view that sentences disproportionate to either the offense or the
offender can be struck down on constitutional grounds by appellate
courts.
The proportionality doctrine has also been applied in other areas
of penology, notably in the determination of punishments for disciplinary infractions within the prison itself. Now that procedural due
process is rapidly becoming a requirement in prison disciplinary hearings, 12 some restrictions must be placed upon the punishments which
can be meted out by disciplinary boards, lest the due process requirements become a hollow guarantee.
The first hint that the doctrine of proportionality might be
applied in the prison setting came in Fulwood v. Clemmer,88 where a
prisoner had been involved in a scuffle involving proselytizing for the
Black Muslims. "Reclassified" to maximum security segregation for
over two years, he sought and obtained relief from the federal courts.
In reaching its decision, the district court declared, "[A] prisoner may
not be unreasonably punished for the infraction of a rule. A punishment out of proportion to the violation may bring it within the bar
84
against unreasonable punishments."
A number of courts have followed the Clemmer lead. In Dabney
v. Cunningham, 5 an inmate's "attitude," as reflected in his request
for "meaningful" work, was used as a reason for sending him to solitary
confinement; the court overturned the decision. Similarly, in Wright v.
McMann, 6 the court upheld an award of damages to an inmate who
had been sent to one year of solitary confinement for refusing to sign
a "safety sheet" in the prison industry. The court took special pains to
is United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971). The court there overturned a five

year sentence (the maximum) for a draft resister when it was discovered that the sentencing
judge had, for the 80 years in which he had been on the bench, always sentenced draft
resisters to the maximum. Such a blanket rule, the court held, was an abuse of discretion,
and could therefore be overturned. Cf. United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d
855 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd per curiam sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967);
United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959).
82 Although the cases vary as to the quantum of procedural due process which must
be accorded, they all agree that more is required than is currently given in most prisons.
For cases granting the most sweeping remedies, see Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Bundy V.
Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
88 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
84 Id. at 379 (footnote omitted).
85 317 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Va. 1970).
88 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972).
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point out that the inmate had not refused to work, but had simply
feared that he was releasing the state from liability for any injury he
7
might sustain on the job.
The vast majority of cases still do not apply the proportionality
doctrine to prison punishment.8 8 Solitary confinement has been handed
out for standing watch for an inmate poker game, 9 for refusing to
work,90 for calling a guard a Klansman, 91 for "impudence," 92 and for
failing to "shell peanuts." 98 Revocation of time credited toward the
term of imprisonment for good behavior ("good time") has been
upheld, or at least has not been invalidated, in situations in which an
inmate who had four ounces of grain alcohol in his cell lost one year
of good time, 94 and in which an inmate in the federal penitentiary in
Atlanta lost 227 days of good time credit for having "conspired to
defame the character" of a prison employee and for "[using] a typewriter without authority." 95 Some cases, however, have indicated a
willingness to apply the proportionality doctrine to cases involving
potential loss of accrued good time. 9
The proportionality issue is similarly raised when determinations
are made concerning the length of time a prisoner is sent to solitary
confinement or is otherwise deprived of certain privileges. Here, the
courts have been almost uniformly resistant,9 7 although noting that the
leading authorities on penology suggest a maximum time limit of no
more than thirty days in solitary confinement.9 8
Intriguingly, courts which have applied the proportionality doctrine to prison discipline while citing Weems and other cases 9 have
87 Id. at 133.
88 The courts usually have not rejected the point; it simply has not been raised in
many cases by prisoners filing pro se complaints. The following cases (notes 89-98 and
accompanying text infra) are unique in this regard.
89 Startti v. Beto, 405 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 929 (1969).
90 E.g., Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963); Rhinehart v. Rhay, 314 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Fallis v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 780
(M.D. Pa. 1967).
91 See Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 674 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971).
92 Id.
93 Id.

94 Sullivan v. Ciccone, 311 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
95 Thierault v. Blackwell, 437 F.2d 76, 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971).
96 See, e.g., Katzoff v. McGinnis, 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1971); Carothers v. Follette,
314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
97 See, e.g., Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
98 See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 & n.14 (2d Cir. 1971).
99 E.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
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not hesitated or stumbled over the possible limitations upon the proportionality doctrine. Instead, these courts have simply applied the
concept of "nonexcessiveness" to invalidate the punishment assessed. 00
Although these courts remain in the distinct minority, their number
is constantly increasing.
III
COMPARING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE Two DOCTRINES

The headway that the proportionality doctrine has made in the
world of penology suggests that some courts are uncomfortable with a
system which allows both the length of a man's imprisonment and the
kind of imprisonment he is to undergo to be determined by a trial
judge whose determination is not subject to judicial review. 101 Although
a recent Supreme Court case indicating that the substantive grounds
for parole revocation may be subject to appellate scrutiny10 2 may also
suggest a requirement of appellate review of sentences, the practical
reality is that few sentences are reviewed, and of those only a small
percentage are reversed or modified on appeal. Except for express
statutory provisions,' 0 3 the only entrance to such appellate review thus
far has been the proportionality doctrine.
The doctrine of proportionality has many limitations, however,
which require the exploration of other approaches if substantive limitations are to be placed upon punishments which can be meted out,
10D See, e.g., Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915
(1969); Startti v. Beto, 405 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1969); Fallis v. United States, 263 F. Supp.
780 (M.D. Pa. 1967). All three cases held that solitary confinement was "justified" on the
facts, hence nonexcessive.
3.01 Although appellate review of sentences is gaining momentum in this country, the
majority of states still do not allow it, notwithstanding the findings of many important
study commissions which have endorsed the concept. For some key materials on the issue,
see AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PRojECr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JsTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING To APPELLATE REvImw OF SENTENCES (1968); Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REv. 671 (1962); Sobeloff, The
Sentence of the Court: Should There be Appellate Review?, 41 A.BAJ. 13 (1955); Thomas,
Appellate Review of Sentences and the Development of Sentencing Policy: The English
Experience, 20 ALA. L. REv. 193 (1968); Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing
Decisions:A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960).
102 Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971) (per curiam). The Supreme Court's decision in Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), holding that due process must be observed
before parole may be revoked, promises protection for the inmate's procedural rights
both in the revocation and release stages. It is likely that the reasons for revocation or
denial, and perhaps even conditions of parole or probation, will become increasingly
important.
103 E.g., IowA CODE § 793.18 (1971); N.Y. CODE CRIm. PRO. § 450.30 (McKinney 1971).
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either in sentencing or in the prison itself. The first and most important
of these drawbacks is that the proportionality doctrine, at least as
thus far implemented, puts the burden of proof upon the defendant or
prisoner to demonstrate that the penalty inflicted is excessive. Application of the least drastic alternative doctrine, on the other hand,
would dearly place the burden of justification upon the state.104 Articulation of the premise of the latter doctrine with respect to the
prison situation suggests that if the state seeks to deprive the defendant
of his liberty, it must demonstrate that the severity of the restriction is
"necessary" to the purpose of the incarceration.
Closely related to this weakness of the proportionality doctrine,
indeed, almost an inevitable corollary of it, is the standard which has
accompanied the birth of the concept: that the eighth amendment
proscribes as excessive only those punishments which "shock the conscience" of civilized society. 10 5 Thus, in Weems, the Court looked to
punishments inflicted in parts of the United States for various crimes,
comparing the severity of each punishment with the social undesirability of each offense.10 6 Similarly, in the Ralph case, the court spent much
of its time rehearsing the position of other countries on whether the
death penalty could be inflicted for rape. Citing United Nations studies
and statutes from other jurisdictions in this country,10 7 the court concluded that the eighth amendment dictated that the death penalty
should not be imposed for the crime of "nonviolent" rape. 08
The difficulty with this approach is that it is susceptible of reducing the scope of the eighth amendment to the least common
denominator. So long as other countries and jurisdictions tolerate or
endorse a given practice, conservative courts, loath to expand the
Constitution to review sentencing or punishment determinations, can
find locales in which those sentences or punishments are still standard.
The state can be expected to argue that if there is one other system
which has adopted a given sentence or which consistently gives some
specific kind of sentence to offenders of the class being considered, that
104 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 30 (1972); Lake v. Cameron, 864 F.2d 657 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
105 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 556 US. 86, 101-03 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 365-68 (1910).
106 There are degrees of homicide that are not punished so severely [as the punishment for the falsification of a government ledger], nor are the following crimes:
misprision of treason, inciting rebellion, conspiracy to destroy the Government by
force, recruiting soldiers in the United States to fight against the United States,
forgery of letters patent, forgery of bonds and other instruments for the purpose
of defrauding the United States, robbery, larceny and other crimes.

217 U.. at 880.
107 Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 791-92 nn.18 & 20 (4th Cir. 1970).
108 Id. at 793; see notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
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sentence would be prima facie applicable to the present offender as
well. Conversely, under the doctrine of the least drastic alternative,
it may be argued that if other prison systems comparable in material
respects to the one challenged in the proceeding before the court can
survive without the particular regulation, then the latter must also
survive, even if still other systems have not yet moved as far.109 Thus,
a prison system or sentencing structure under attack should be compared with systems which have abandoned the challenged practice. If
the latter system has continued without grave deficiency and the two
systems are indeed comparable, then the court may well strike down
the sentence or regulation.
A third weakness of the proportionality doctrine also stems from
the burden of proof problem. Because it does not put the government
to any test, but rather requires that the challenger show that other
governments have abandoned a given practice, the doctrine fails to
elicit a purpose or rationale for the practice attacked. Thus, for
example, if the challenge is to sentences of fifteen years imprisonment
and the government demonstrates that some countries, at least, con109 One of the most important cases applying this doctrine is Brown v. Peyton, 437
F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971). The Brown case involved the admission of Black Muslim reading
materials into state prisons. This issue had been treated previously by the same circuit in
Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968), where the court had allowed
virtually all such material to be banned. In Brown, the court held that the issue presented
was a factual question as to the existence of serious danger to the institution and that
sufficient time had passed since Abernathy to warrant another hearing on the effect of the
reading materials on prison administration. In so holding the court relied heavily upon
the fact that other prisons which had previously banned the same materials now allowed
them in without experiencing disruption. 437 F.2d at 1282. In this sense, at least, Brown
suggests the adoption of a totally new approach to prison litigation.
A similar decision was reached in Theriault v. Carlson, 839 F. Supp. 375 (N.M. Ga.
1972), where the court chided past prison administrators for their fear of Black Muslim
activities and required the federal penitentiary in Atlanta to recognize the newly-formed
Church of the New Song and to grant it all rights given other religious groups in the
institution.
Another example of the use of the doctrine inside prisons is the court's finding in
Landman v. Royster, 33 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971), that placing an inmate in chains
or handcuffs is excessive.
Finally, one court has ambiguously employed the phrase in speaking of the rights
of pre-trial detainees. In Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.J). Cal. 1972), Judge
Zirpoli, speaking of conditions at a local jail, declared:
Holding [pre-trial detainees] continuously in cells is unquestionably an expedient
method of insuring security, but such oppressive confinement is not the least restrictive alternative available to the defendants for maintaining jail security....
Certainly it is difficult to conceive of a compelling necessity to deny the
plaintiff class liberal access to a basic library of books, magazines and newspapers.
Merely because all such resources may be labelled "rehabilitative" in other institutional contexts does not justify denying them to pre-trial detainees.
Id. at 140.
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tinue to impose such sanctions, one would not expect a court to throw
that practice out, even though the purpose of the two systems in
inflicting penalties may be totally different. If eight countries, for
example, continue to use solitary confinement, it might be said that
solitary confinement is not unconstitutional, even if the stated purpose
of punishment in those countries is retribution, where the purpose of
punishment in this country is something different. Under the proportionality doctrine, qualitative analysis yields to quantitative
measurement. In contrast, the least drastic alternative by definition
seeks to know the purpose of the practice involved, for it is only if that
purpose is articulated that the court may determine whether the
method chosen serves that purpose. Again, an example may clarify.
If a court sentenced a pickpocket to have his right hand chopped off,
the proportionality-civilized society standard would simply ask whether
other countries allowed such a punishment. The least drastic alternative
doctrine would ask why we impose a sentence; if the answer were, for
example, that sentences should be imposed to individualize treatment
and rehabilitate the offender, no possible defense could be raised to
protect the brutal sentence from being invalidated, no matter how
many other countries allowed such a punishment. The fact that those
other countries might seek vengeance as a motive for punishment
would be irrelevant in the proportionality test, but critical in the least
drastic alternative formula.
"May no fate willfully misunderstand me," Robert Frost once
10 The proportionality doctrine
said, "And half grant what I wish ... ."1
has its place in both sentencing and judging prison disciplinary sanctions. It should be retained and invigorated where consistent with its
theoretical limitations. But the thesis expounded here is that the
doctrine of the least drastic alternative should be vigorously applied
to the entire system of corrections, starting, particularly and importantly, with the sentencing process, and continuing until the
prisoner's final release from any custody or supervision. We turn,
then, to examine how this might be accomplished and how far the
courts have already moved toward this goal.

IV
APPLYING LEAST DRASTIC ALTERNATIVE
DOCrRINE TO SENTENCING

Because application of the doctrine in the civil liberties field is

new, there is some uncertainty about its parameters, particularly as ap110 R. FRoST, Birches, in MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 87, 89 (1916).
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plied to sentencing techniques.'
Chief Justice Burger's short, bitter
dissent in Dunn v. Blumstein"2 was concerned lest the compelling state
interest standard and, by implication, the least drastic alternative
doctrine, establish an "insurmountable" barrier to any effective action
by the state. He suggested, as illustrative of the path he believed the
standard must require, that all age limits on voting, being inherently
arbitrary, could never meet the compelling state interest test.113 Assuming that this taciturn remark was intended to say that there is no
compelling state interest in an age limit of, say, eighteen, because not
all persons one day less than eighteen are less mature, etc., than their
one-day elders, he is undoubtedly correct. And, surely, if the Court
were saying that numerical barriers must fall because there is never
any showing that the barrier minus one unit cannot achieve the goal
just as easily, he is correct. But a closer inspection of both the least
drastic alternative doctrine and the Court's approach in Dunn demonstrates that the Court was not making such a sweeping declaration.
First, the Dunn Court simply invalidated two state voting registration waiting periods, one of one year's residence in the state and the
other of three months' residence in the county of application, suggesting that these time limits were too long, that is, disproportionate,
properly to achieve the legitimate purposes of the state.- In discussing the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its, thirty-day
limitation period on residency for presidential elections,11 4 the Court
compared the practices of other jurisdictions and suggested that these
jurisdictions were able to protect their interests with less severe requirements."6 Moreover, the Court adhered to the principle- that the
jurisdictions must be comparable in some meaningful sense. Thus,
for example, if a challenge to registration procedures were to be raised
in New York City based on the fact that North Dakota has no registration at all, anywhere in the state, the challenge would probably fail,
since a cogent argument could be made that the two populations and
jurisdictions are not sufficiently similar."16
111 For example, it might be suggested by those who oppose the application of the
doctrine to sentencing that a defendant could argue that a sentence of five years' imprisonment is "too drastic," since a sentence of 4 years, 11 months, and 29 days would be "less
drastic" and still serve the needs of the community.
112 405 U.S. 220, 363-64 (1972); see notes 25 & 32 and accompanying text supra.
118 405 U.S. at 863.
114 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (1970); see 405 US. at 244.
115 405 U.S. at 246. Since Dunn, a number of cases have struck down durational residence requirements, strongly hinting that only a 20-day period will be tolerated in
the future. See, e.g., Hinnant v. Sebesta, 346 F. Supp. 913 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Nicholls v.
Schaffer, 344 F. Supp. 238 (D. Conn. 1972); Graham v. Waller, 343 F. Supp. I (S.D. Miss.

1972).
116 If, however, the challenger could show that the jurisdictions were similar, or that
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More importantly, the Court in Dunn assumed, in the absence
of a state showing to the contrary, that a thirty-day residence requirement was sufficient to meet the only state interests which the state
could legitimately press: voter familiarity with election issues and
administrative ease in handling voting on election day. 117 An alternative showing could have been made; the state could have come forward
to demonstrate that there was no conceivable way in which it could
administratively handle election processes unless given sixty or ninety
days. The problem in Dunn was, simply, that the state had pressed
"interests" which could not be shown to require a longer waiting
period. If such a showing could have been made on the record, it is
likely that the Court would have decided for the state. Further, if there
were no interest capable of proof and there existed an action which
the state conceded was arbitrary, the state might still prevail under
certain circumstances. Thus, for example, if a four-year-old sought to
vote in an election, the state could concede that the eighteen-year-old
level was arbitrary, but argue that in protecting its interest, there being
no provable criteria which were administratively feasible, the state
must be arbitrary. A thirty-day filing limit on appeals, on the other
hand, might be more susceptible to challenge, since the interests at
stake there (finality of litigation, etc.) might bend to the facts of a
particular case without damaging the interest totally. Thus, the fears
of the Chief Justice could be allayed, while the thrust of the majority
opinion would remain.
Given this analysis, one may quickly dispose of the suggestion
that a defendant sentenced to five years' imprisonment could argue
that one day less imprisonment would be constitutionally mandated.
Like the eighteen-year-old vote situation, the state must concede that
the actual number of days chosen is somewhat arbitrary, an approximation only, and argue instead that the approximation is necessary to preclude impossibly intricate factual determinations concerning each individual. Moreover, in a battle of this type, the state
has, at least potentially, an insuperable ally-the possibility that parole
may be granted in the future, which thus blunts the offender's challenge
of a specific maximum sentence.
Thus, in terms of the length of incarceration per se, the least
drastic alternative doctrine may either be inapplicable by its very
nature or so cumbersome to employ that it must be abandoned. But
there was no relevant difference, the opposite result might well follow. See, e.g., Michigan
State UAW Community Action Program Council v. Austin, - Mich. -, 198 N.W.2d 85,
389-90 & n.8 (1972) (comparing Michigan's "purge" statute with those of other states).
117 See 405 US. at 845-60.
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Covington" 8 and Lake,119 and to a lesser extent Dixon 20 and Ashe, 1 21
suggest a new, and perhaps even more exciting arena for the doctrine
in the sentencing process. Like Ralph,122 and to a lesser degree, Workman 23 and Watson, 24 these cases require the government to show
that the type of punishment, rather than its length, is justifiable as
applied to the specific individual involved. Thus, in the Lake situation
the state must demonstrate that institutionalization is the least drastic
alternative for this petitioner. In the Ralph situation, the state must
demonstrate the capital punishment is "necessary" to serve the state's
purpose when the facts of this defendant's crime are considered. In
short, the doctrine, as applied to sentencing, would require the state
to demonstrate that, as to the specific defendant before the court, the
type of punishment inflicted is "necessary" to achieve its "purpose"
in sentencing anyone.
It is not necessary to delve into the long and tedious debate over
the "purpose" of the criminal law or of sentencing. I have elsewhere
attempted to enunciate the goals of the sentencing process; 25 here I
shall simply attempt to summarize that discussion.
The goal of the criminal law in its broadest sense is the protection
of innocent persons from further criminal activity on the part of those
whom we determine to be law violators. In the past, several ways have
been suggested in which the sentencing process may achieve this goal:
(1) special deterrence of the individual criminal; (2) general deterrence
of the noncriminal population as it views the punishments which
are inflicted upon the criminal;126 and (3) rehabilitation of the criminal,
transforming him from law violator to law obeyer. Of these methods,
only the last may truly prove achievable. Special deterrence by sim18 Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
119 Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

120 Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
121 Ashe v. Robinson, 450 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
122 Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
123 Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1968).
124 Watson v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 2352 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 1968), vacated and
remanded, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
125 R. SINGER, SENTENCING DIsPosrriONS (forthcoming), to be published as a working

paper to the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.
126 The concept of general deterrence may be ascribed first to Bentham. 1 J.
BENTHAM, Principlesof Penal Law pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 6, in WoRxs 899 (1848). The concept has

received continuous criticism. See, e.g., Sellin, Death and Imprisonment as Deterrents to
Murder, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 274 (H. Bedau ed. 1964). Recent modifications
of the doctrine, most made by Professor Johannes Andenaes, have resulted in a revitalization
of the principle. See Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 48 J. CMM.
L.C. & P.S. 176 (1952); Andenaes, The GeneralPreventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 949 (1966). The entire area of deterrence has been examined recently in F.
G, PEP rrETvEs oN DETERRENCE (1971).
ZrmRm
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ple incarceration does not work; high recidivism rates 2 7 show that
while incapacitation clearly protects the public from the offender
while he is in prison, it does not achieve lasting deterrence. Nor does
general deterrence, as originally espoused by Bentham, work. First,
the "clearing" rate of criminal activity is so low' 28 that those involved
in criminal activity are not deterred because the likelihood of actual
detection is minimal. 129 Second, the theory presupposes that the
criminally prone calculate the chances of being detected against the
pleasure to be obtained by law violations; most violators are not so
rational at the moment of commission. Third, the theory presupposes,
again erroneously, that the general public is aware of the actual
punishments inflicted upon those who are detected. 3 0
These observations cast grave doubts upon the deterrent efficacy
of punishment and particularly of sentencing dispositions. Since we
have long rejected the goal of simple retribution as a legitimate aim
127 Estimates of recidivism vary widely. It is reported that
among those convicted defendants for whom the prior criminal record [arrests
and convictions] was reported, 64 percent had a prior criminal record compared
to 66 percent in 1968 and 65 percent in 1967. The proportion of persons sentenced
to probation with a prior criminal record decreased from 53 percent in 1968 to 49
percent in 1969. While 82 percent of all persons sentenced to imprisonment had a
prior criminal record, this proportion was 89 percent for persons with mixed
sentences.
As in 1968, one out of every four defendants convicted in 1969 had a prior
prison record, that is, one or more commitments of over one year to [sic] confinement.
ADMINISrRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, FEDmRAL OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATs Dis-

14, 17 (1969). FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPoRTs (1971) indicates that 63% of all
persons released from prison in 1965 were rearrested within four years of that release. Id.
at 39. The 1970 report indicates that rearrest (not synonymous with recidivism) varied
according to the type of crime:
[R]earrests ranged from 25 percent for the income tax violators to 82 percent
of the auto thieves. The predatory crime offenders had high repeat rates with 79
percent of the burglars being rearrested within 6 years, 76 percent of assault
offenders, and 66 percent of the robbers released in 1963. Likewise, 72 percent of
the narcotic offenders who are frequently users were rearrested after release.
FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 37 (1970).
TRicr CouRTs

128

Of all crimes commited, probably no more than half are reported. Of these, only

20% are cleared by arrest. See UNIFORM CRnux REoRTs (1970), supra note 127, at 115.
129 Intriguingly, it appears that those in areas in which crime rates are on the increase overestimate the clearance rate. See N. WALRER, SENTENCING IN A RATIONAL SoCIETY
64-66 (1971).
130 F. ZIMRING, supra note 126, at 56-61, shows that persons living in high delinquency
areas, where the expectation might be that there would be higher familiarity with the
penalties attached to the various crimes, were in fact no more acquainted with the actual
punishments than residents of low crime rate areas. Even prisoners, arguably the most
well-versed in these terms, were only 25% accurate in choosing the correct answer on a
multiple choice test concerning the minimum and maximum sentences for various crimes.
Id. at 57.
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of the criminal law and of sentencing, 31 the one remaining method
by which the general public may be protected is the reformation of
the individual offender into a law-abiding citizen.
We do not yet know how to "reform" criminals, although efforts
along those lines have been a continual goal of the criminal justice
system. But we do know some things. We know, for example, that the
"failure" rate in "treatment-oriented" institutions is nearly as high as
that in "punitive" institutions. 3 2 This fact would indicate that incarceration is not universally, and perhaps not even specifically, beneficial in terms of the ultimate goal of the criminal law. We also know,
however, that those offenders placed on probation, or otherwise not
incarcerated in remote, punitive, institutions, seem to fare better, in
terms of recidivism rates, 33 than those who are placed in those institutions and released at the expiration of their sentences. It is true,
of course, that these statistics are suspect, if for no other reason than
the obvious fact that judges are more likely to place on probation those
persons less likely to recidivate, thereby skewing the data by a "selffulfilling" prophecy factor. Also, probation officers may be less prone
to seek revocation for a minor violation of a technical condition of
probation, whereas a parole officer, faced with the knowledge that the
parolee has been sent to prison, may be more willing to seek earlier
revocation.
No matter what figures are used, at least one point is patent:
probation is ultimately no more dangerous to the community than is
sending a man to prison. If, as a matter of policy, we determine that
liberty is to be taken away completely only if a benefit to the community can be demonstrated, probation or some other form of community supervision should be preferred.
This solution would appear even more attractive if some criteria
were developed by which to identify the truly dangerous offender who
may in fact recidivate immediately upon release. This would allow a
"presumption" of probation for the "nondangerous" offender. In short,
131 Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949), suggesting that retribution is
no longer the "dominant" objective of criminal law.
182 See G. KASSEBAUM, D. WARD &D. WLNER, PRISON TEATMEmrr AND PARoLE SURVIVAL
passim (1971).
133 According to UNIFORm CRiME REPORTS (1971), supra note 127, lowest rearrest rates

were found among those persons fined and placed on probation. All those placed in nonincarcerated situations were below an average rate of 63%. Id. at 39. Other studies demonstrate a "success" rate of well over 757 of those on probation. See, e.g., England, What Is
Responsible for Satisfactory Probation and Post-Probation Outcome?, 47 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 667 (1957). See also P. TAPPAN, CRME, JusmcIE AND CoREEF.ION 576-84 (1960).
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the "least drastic alternative" for the "nondangerous" offender would
seem to be probation rather than imprisonment.
This suggestion is hardly radical. The American Law Institute
has in fact recommended a presumption in favor of probation for
every offender.184 Similarly, the American Bar Association, after a
long and detailed study of sentencing and its effects upon the offender,
has declared that nonincarceration is to be preferred-in every case
-- over any form of incarceration. 18 5 Should imprisonment be mandated, however, "partial confinement" is to be preferred over "total
134 The presumption is interesting in view of the original (1954) draft of the section,
which provided precisely the opposite-that every offender was to be incarcerated unless
certain factors in favor of probation were present. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1954). The current version of the presumption is found in MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01
(1962), which provides:
(1) The Court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime
without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the
defendant, it is of the opinion that his imprisonment is necessary for protection
of the public because:
(a) there is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institute; or
(c) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's
crime.
(2) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the Court,
shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of imprisonment(a) the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious
harm;
(b) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would
cause or threaten serious harm;
(c) the defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e) the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated
its commission;
(f the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained;
(g) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity
or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime;
(h) the defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances
unlikely to recur,
(i)the character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another crime;
(j) the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment;
(k) the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship
to himself or his dependants.
135 AMERICAN BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 2.3(c) & comment e
at 72-73 (1967).
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confinement."'31 6 Both of these studies conclude that all interests of
society can best be protected by requiring the state to justify severe
restrictions on liberty and freedom. The only difference between those
recommendations and the analysis offered here is that those bodies
simply recommended, as good policy, the implementation of such a
system. The analysis set forth here suggests that this system is constitutionally required as a matter of due process under the doctrine of
the least drastic alternative.
Some courts have already moved toward such a position. Of the
cases thus far decided, none is more clear and forward looking than
United States v. Waters.187 In Waters, a young offender was eligible
for sentencing under the Youth Corrections Act, 138 which specifies
that the purpose of sentencing under that act is rehabilitation. 39 He
was instead sentenced by the trial court as a regular adult felon. On an
appeal from that sentence, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
in a unanimous holding, declared that trial courts must in the future
specify the reasons for not sentencing an otherwise eligible offender
under the Youth Corrections Act.140 In effect, the court held that there
was a presumption in favor of sentencing young offenders under the
136

137
138
139
140

Id. §§ 2.4(c), 2.5(c) & comment n at 107-08.
437 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1970).
Id. § 5011.
The court said,

While the District Court does have discretion to sentence a 19-year-old "youth
offender" under either the applicable statutory offense provision or the Youth Corrections Act, we believe that this discretion is circumscribed by the findings of
fact in the individual case which the District Judge is required to make either explicitly or implicitly. Under Section 5010(b), it is clear that the appellant is a
"youth offender," and it is clear that the offense is punishable by imprisonment
under other applicable provisions of law. Therefore, the court may sentence under
this subsection (b) or the following subsection (c), both of which provide for rehabilitative treatment in a youth institution. Or, alternatively, the court may sentence under the following subsection (d), but only if the applicable facts in the
individual case meet the statutory requirements. Subsection (d) requires: "If the
court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment
under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the youth offender under
any other applicable penalty provision."
Only if the court found that the appellant youth offender would not
O..

derive benefit from rehabilitative treatment under the Youth Corrections Act did
the District Court have discretion to sentence appellant under the regular adult
statutory provision.
437 F.2d at 725-27 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). The case was remanded for
resentencing, and the lower court again sentenced Waters under the regular adult felon
classification. United States v. Waters, 324 F. Supp. 1056 (D.D.C. 1971). However, it did so
only after specifying reasons as the court of appeals had held was required. Id. at 1061.
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Act and that the state agent, in this case the judge, bore the burden
of demonstrating that such a rehabilitative sentence was not justified
on the facts of this particular record.
Waters can, of course, be distinguished from the "normal" case.
First, Waters dealt with a specific statute which articulated the general
purpose to be achieved in sentencing any young offender; in the normal
adult offender case, no such statutory directive can be found. Second,
the court was apparently exercising its supervisory powers over the
District of Columbia, rather than issuing a decision based on the
Constitution, thereby limiting the effect of the opinion to the District.
Third, the case involved a specific "type" of offender, much like the
drug offender in Watson or the juvenile offender in Workman,
towards whom the courts and the criminal justice system generally have
been more solicitous.
The impact of Waters is, therefore uncertain. But there is no doubt
that the spirit of the decision was followed and given breadth in United
States v. A lsbrook.141 In A lsbrook, a district court panel held that failure
to sentence youthful offenders to Lorton Youth Center in Virginia on
the sole basis that Lorton was overcrowded was an invalid exercise of
sentencing power. Instead, the court ordered the immediate relief of
the overcrowded situation at that institution.1 42 Again, it may be urged
that Alsbrook, another Youth Corrections Act case, is distinguishable
on that basis alone. Several factors, however, do not support such summary treatment. First, the court spoke not in terms of the Act, but
rather in terms of the need for rehabilitation. Second, the court, in a
supplemental memorandum dated nearly two weeks after the original
decision, noted that although some action had been taken to comply
with the opinion, more forthright steps were necessary. 143 In its last
sentence, the court declared that "[t]he Constitution, the Youth Corrections Act, and the conscience of a civilized society require that youth
offenders receive firm but effective opportunity for treatment and
realistic rehabilitation."' 44 The reference to the Constitution was the
first in the entire opinion; that the court deemed it significant seems
obvious from its inclusion. Perhaps equally important, however, is the
reference to the "conscience of a civilized society." This oblique reference to the scope of the eighth amendment allows anticipation of future
elaboration on the Alsbrook case, changing it from one of ambiguous
141 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971).
142 Id. at 979.
143 Id. at 981.
144 Id. at 983.
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constitutional dimensions to one brimming with constitutional impli45
cations.1
Since, as we have seen, probation, or at least some form of punishment less severe than prison seems to serve affirmatively the state's
initial interest in protecting society, there remains only the question whether some subsidiary interest might sufficiently overcome the
concept of a presumption of probation. The major ground the state
would have for objecting to the presumption of probation, given the
data already presented, is that the problem of proving that probation
is unwarranted is too difficult and that failure to meet the presumption
could easily result in the premature and unwise release into society of
persons who do not belong there.
Several responses to this argument are possible. First, the problem
of defining the "dangerous" criminal has been dealt with by a number
of studies, each of which has devised its own definition. 46 While there
are gaps in their coverages, these definitions could be used as initial at145 This road has been traveled before on similar issues. In Rouse v. Cameron, 373

F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that there was a
statutory right to psychiatric treatment. In successive cases, the court strengthened that
holding, and expanded the scope of judicial review of hospital decisions. See Ashe v. Robinson, 450 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Williams
v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104
(D.C. Cir. 1967). Then, scarcely five years after Rouse, the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Alabama, relying heavily on the analysis in Rouse, held that the
right to treatment was a constitutional right which needed no statute for its protection.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), modified, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
1971), modified, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The story of the Wyatt case is painstakingly captured in Drake, Enforcing The Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10
Am. Caum. L. REv. 587 (1972). For earlier discussions of the general area, see Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 742 (1969); Symposium-The Right
to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673 (1969). The progenitor of the theory was Morton Birnbaum.
See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960); Birnbaum, Some Remarks
on the "Right to Treatment," 23 ALA. L. REv. 623 (1971). There has been recent speculation as to an analogous "right to rehabilitation" in prisons. See, e.g., Comment, A jam in
the Revolving Door: A Prisoner's Right to Rehabilitation, 60 GEO. L.J. 225 (1971); Comment, A Statutory Right to Treatment for Prisoners: A Society's Right of Self-Defense,
50 NmB. L. REv. 543 (1971). Yet another issue is the right to refuse treatment. See McNeil
v. Director, 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to
"Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav.
616 (1972). See also N. KrrrRE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT (1971).
146 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03 (1962); MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 5 (1963); AMERICAN
BAR Ass'N PRojEcr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 3.3(f) (1967). See also, PRsDFNT'S COMM'N ON
LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsrICE, supra note 7, at 203 (1967). There is
considerable debate, however, over whether dangerousness can ever be predicted. See
generally von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of
Convicted Persons, 21 BUrALo L. REv. 717 (1972).
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tempts to solve this operational dilemma. Protection of the public
safety would be left in the hands of the legislature, which would be
able to alter or amend any of these standards. Of course, any attempt
to undermine the concept, such as defining a "dangerous criminal" as
anyone convicted of a felony, would be highly suspect constitutionally.
Second, the difficulty of determining who is "dangerous"'147 has, in
the past, led the courts too often to err on the side of caution and excessive incarceration. Two separate studies demonstrate this. In Florida,
after Gideon v. Wainwright4 8 established that indigent defendants
have a right to counsel in state criminal prosecutions and that a trial
and conviction without such assistance violates the fourteenth amendment, it was determined that rather than retry all of the inmates so
convicted, it would be administratively more convenient simply to
release them. The results were astounding: the recidivism rate of the
Gideon releasees was one-half that of prisoners who served their maximum sentence. 14 Even accounting for idiosyncracies, these data bring
147 Until the 1971 Term of the Supreme Court, the problem of defining dangerous-

ness might have been viewed as an esoteric one. In the wake of three highly significant
recent decisions, however, that may no longer be true. In Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504
(1972), the Court strongly indicated that thin statutory lines between those defined as
"mentally ill" and those defined as "sexual criminals" did not justify different commitment
procedures. Id. at 512. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the Court took this reasoning one step further, specifically holding that a state may not, consonant with due
process, continue to incarcerate an individual charged with a crime even though it appears
that he will never become competent to stand trial and, further, that due process almost
certainly requires an individual's release as soon as he becomes "nondangerous." Id. at
731-39. Although the Jackson case did not really seek to define dangerousness, its main
stress was on danger to others, rather than, for example, danger to oneself. Finally, in
McNeil v. Director, 407 U.S. 245 (1972), the Court ordered the release of a convicted
criminal after the expiration of his maximum sentence, although the state sought to
continue his incarceration to determine whether he was a "defective delinquent" subject
to indeteminate incarceration under Maryland's famed statutory network. These three
cases, taken together, could indicate an entirely new thrust in the field of constitutional
correctional and civil liberties law connected with incarceration. It is probably sufficient
to note here that (1) Jackson clearly held that extended precriminal incarceration beyond
the point of dangerousness was violative of due process; (2) Humphrey dearly indicates
that the distinction between criminal/noncriminal and precriminal/postcriminal, in terms
of the purpose of incarceraton and procedures by which incarceration may be determined, are highly suspect constitutionally; and (3) McNeil suggests that, at the very
least, the state cannot hold an offender past the term of his criminal sentence without
having proved adequate justification for civil commitment, which, under Jackson, seems to
be a showing of dangerousness. Together, the cases might-and this is highly tentative
-pave the way for an eventual holding that criminal incarceration (as opposed to civil
incarceration) can only be justified on the basis of dangerousness, and that nondangerous criminals must be dealt with on a basis other than incarceration. The revolutionary
thrust of this interpretation of these cases is evident.
148 372 US. 335 (1963).
149 See C. EcrarAN, THE IMPAcr OF THE GIDEON DEcISION UPON CRim AND SENTENCING
IN FLORIDA: A STUDY OF REcmiDm AND SOCIOCULTURAL CENGE 71-73 (1966).
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both enlightenment and distress, for it seems to indicate that the more
time one spends in prison, the less likely he is to succeed on the outside; while this is certainly a common-sense impression, it is a very
unpleasant piece of information to digest.
The second study, "Operation Baxstrom,"'15 indicates the difficulty
which would result from an imprecise definition of "dangerous." The
operation, named after another Supreme Court case which held that
prisoners could not be transferred to the maximum security criminal
mental hospitals at the expiration of their criminal sentences without
due process, 1" sought to transfer to civil or other hospitals many of
those who had been previously dealt with under the invalidated procedures. Again, the results were astounding-of the more than 900 "dangerous" inmates transferred to less secure institutions, over 140 were
released from the hospital within a year, and only seven were actually
returned to the criminal hospital for the dangerous. 52
These experiences with the difficulty of determining dangerousness-and with the awesome fear that we may be increasing dangerousness by extending incarceration-should lead legislatures to define
clearly, concisely, and narrowly a category of offenders who meet the
definition of dangerous. 5 3 Given the indications of what prison does
to human beings, 54 such a definition should clearly restrict rather than
expand the category of individuals it embraces.
The difficulty in establishing guidelines for the choice between
probation and incarceration in a penal instituton can be reduced substantially by adoption of innovations now being advocated by virtually
every member of the corrections profession. I speak here of the role
which so-called "community corrections centers" can play to assist the
individual in realistically adjusting to that community through his
continued rehabilitation and contact with the community, and by his
supervision under the care of professionals.
Community corrections centers, or near counterparts, are already
in operation in many states in this country. 155 The concept envisions a
150 See Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, 124 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 974

(1968).
151 Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 US. 107 (1966).
152 Hunt & Wiley, supra note 150, at 976.
153 Even if dangerousness is defined for purposes of legislative darity, the problem

remains whether, in fact, the capacity for or likelihood of violence is predictable with any
degree of certainty. One of the leading authorities in criminology has attacked all of the
sentencing studies which include a dangerousness concept on the grounds that psychiatry
simply cannot assure, even to a 50% likelihood, that a given individual is dangerous. See
Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S.CAl. L. REV. 514 (1968).
154 See notes 159-62 and accompanying text infra.
155 For a general discussion of the concept, see U.S. BUREAu OF PIuSONS, THE RESMEN-
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program in which small groups of offenders live together in a house
or dormitory facility. The offender is not placed directly back into the
environment which contributed to his delinquency nor is he entirely
removed from the community. Care includes both in-house service and
post-release service, aimed at enabling the offender to adjust to tensions which others are able to deal with or to forget. 5 6
The major difference between these centers and penal institutions
is the degree of responsibility which the residents have in the facility's
operations. Most houses allow the residents a large voice in deciding
both admissions to the center and conditions under which a new admittee will live. 157 "Treatment" is a constant theme. In addition to the

group therapy sessions which seem to be omnipresent in these institutions, educational and vocational rehabilitation opportunities are constantly made available. Most encouraging of all, however, is the fact that
these corrections centers, halfway house, pre-release centers, and other
facilities of this type cover the gamut of possible offenders' 58 with
apparently no adverse effects.
The present success of these programs and centers, whatever their
current composition, argues strongly in favor of their consideration as
methods alternative to sentencing. Community closeness ensures that
ties with family and friends will be continued, rather than effectively
severed as so often occurs as a result of distant incarceration. 59 Work
release programs retain the offender's earning power by day, while
affording him guidance and care at night, hopefully enabling him to
discover different methods of dealing with life's problems. It seems
clear that community centers offer much hope for the future of corrections and for those who have run afoul of the penal system.
Consideration of these factors leads to a supplemental position in
terms of constitutional law: that the state's interest as well as the inmate's interest in most circumstances require either a disposition of
probation or, if probation seems unwise because of some possibility of
repeated offenses, then a disposition of supervision in a community
corrections center. Where, then, the state wishes to restrict more seTIAL CENTER: ComRmTIoNS IN THE COMMUNrrY

(1971), which includes a comprehensive

bibliography.
156 See id. at 1-2.
157 In California youth centers, the group determines, subject to staff veto, both
entrance to and release from the institution. See Saleebey, Youth Correctional Centers: A
New Approach to Treating Youthful Offenders, 34 FED. PROBATION 49 (March 1970).
158 The residents of such an institution in Pennsylvania, known as Yoke Crist, include
a rapist, an armed robber, and a drug pusher. Detivieler, The Convicts Who Live in a
Mansion, PARADE, Dec. 12, 1971, at 6.
159 See, e.g., P. MoRasS, PRISONERS AND THEIR FAMILIES (1965).
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verely the liberty of the individual-virtually to remove him from all
ties with the community and his family and to subject him to the spartan regimen of a true penal institution-it must demonstrate that his
personal characteristics require such incarceration to serve both the
purpose of rehabilitation and the protection of society from further
criminal activity. In short, since the least drastic alternative is probation or a community correction center, the state must bear the burden
of justification when it seeks incarceration in a penal institution.
This proposition is not likely to be eagerly embraced by many who
see "law and order" as consisting of more remote, harsher, more secure,
institutions, with longer sentences for their residents. But if the tragedy
of Attica has taught us nothing else, it should be that these methods
have not succeeded. Prison today is in many ways more dangerous'0 0
and more degrading' 61 than it was a century ago. While guard-inmate
brutality seems to have been significantly reduced, at least in the physical sense, the indignities suffered by those who seek parole from an
indifferent and ill-prepared board 62 are staggering. The frustrations
which arise from petty rules, often enforced by petty officials whose
total dedication to security makes them incapable of seeing the world
more humanely, are thoroughly attested to by the great number of
prisoner writings which are being published today. 63 These frustrations
160 The many reports of assaults in our institutions seem to warrant a conclusion that,
for the inmates at least, things are more dangerous than ever. See, e.g., INSIDE: PRISON AMERcAN STYL.E (R. Minton ed. 1971); Bunker, War Behind Walls, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Feb.

1972, at 39. The reason for this increased hostility is unclear, but much of it may be radal
animosity, perhaps intensified by guards and, in some cases, higher administrators. Prison
unions, which are just beginning to form, have been touted, at least by prisoners, as one
way to bring solidarity to otherwise warring inmates. See generally Note, Bargaining in
CorrectionalInstitutions: Restructuring the Relation Between the Inmate and the Prison
Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726 (1972).
161 That prison is a process of degradation is clear. Eric Goffman's classic study
stresses the "need" for ceremonies of degradation. E. GOFFMAN, AsYLUMs (1961). When the
present context is considered, inmates who one hundred years ago might have suffered
flogging in public, for example, now find themselves one of the few groups left who are
subjected to particularly degrading situations such as strip searches.
162 See Goodman, Would a System Where Sentences Are Fixed by a Board of Experts
Be Preferable?, 30 F.R.D. 319 (1961); Hayner, Sentencing by an Administrative Board, 28
LAw & CoirEmr
. PROB. 477 (1958). For an insightful, but bitter, exploration of this entire
process, see INsIDE: PRISON AMERICAN SrmE ch. 8 (R. Minton ed. 1971).
163 See, e.g., E. CLEAVER, SoUL ON IcE (1968); A. DAVIS, IF THEY COME IN THE MORNING (1971); H.J. GiswoLD, M. MISENrIMER, A. PowERs & E.. TROM ArNAusaa, AN EYE FOR
AN EYE (1970); G. JACKSON, BLOOD IN MY EYE (1972); G. JACKSON, SoLEDAD BROTHER (1970);
INsIDE: PRISON AMERICAN STYLE (R. Minton ed. 1971); MAmmt'i SEcuarrY (E. Pell ed. 1972).

A coalition of ex-convicts puts out the monthly Penal Digest International,a useful collage
of prison writings, letters, views, etc.
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can, in time, lead to violence from a nonviolent man, much to his irreparable harm.
Other objections to this proposal-that the criteria of dangerousness are too opaque, that turning a "preference" into a burden of proof
problem is unwise, that such considerations will take up too much
time in busy courts-seem to pale when it is remembered that the
decision made at sentencing literally affects years of the one life which
the defendant has. One should never lose sight of the fact that this
decision is vastly more significant than those made in diversity tort cases,
for example, which occupy an inordinately large slice of a federal
court's time, or property settlements and divorce cases, which are key
time consumers in state courts. To those who fear appellate review of
sentences, 1 4 which this proposal surely entails, the answers which the
American Bar Association,'65 a number of state legislatures, 16 6 and
numerous scholars in the field 67 have given seem sufficient.
CONCLUSION

Sentencing today is an archaic process, operating with often unfair
procedures and uncertain goals. The application to this process of the
rule of the least drastic alternative-that the government must prove a
particular action is necessary to effectuate a clear governmental interest
-would both shift the burden of justifying imprisonment to the government and require the government to articulate clearly the rationale
for incarceration. Since penologists and apparently courts have rejected
all traditional penal goals except deterrence and rehabilitation, and
since an examination of empirical data suggests that general deterrence
is a fiction, the government would bear the burden either of demonstrating that the individual offender is so dangerous that he must be
specially deterred-incapacitated-for an especially long period, or
that his rehabilitation calls for some period of incarceration.
If we cannot immediately abolish prisons, as seems clear, then we
164 See, e.g., Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79 (1965).
165 See A mmcAN BAR ASS'N PRojErC ON MINIMIhUI STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (1968).
166 See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717 (1956); ME.

§§ 2141-44 (Supp. 1972); MASS.

GEN. LAws ANN.

REv. STAT. ANN tit. 15,
ch. 278, §§ 28A-28D (Supp. 1972); N.Y.

& Supp. 1970).
167 Virtually all writers on the subject have supported appellate review of sentences.
See, e.g., L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN A MERICA (1939); Mueller, supra note 101;
Sobeloff, supra note 1; Note, supra note 101.
CODE CRim. PRO. §§ 543, 764 (McKinney 1958
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should at least attempt to reduce their populations by employing alternate methods of dealing with those whose incarceration is unjustifiable.
Employing preferences and presumptions against imprisonment can
do this, and the least drastic alternative offers one clear path to reach
such a result.

